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ABSTRACT 
Deception in applicant résumés is a major business problem. With the rapid growth of Internet job 
websites and computer-mediated communication, organizations are more at risk than ever 
before. Researchers have tried to improve individuals’ deception detection accuracy to minimize 
the impact of deception, including warning individuals about deception and training individuals to 
detect deception. However, evidence was found that trained and warned individuals might make 
more incorrect judgments about true information, which are known as false alarms.  Further, few 
previous studies focused on the computer-mediated settings that are now a central part of 
business communication.  After conducting an experiment to understand these and other causes 
of false alarms in computer-mediated interview settings, we found that individuals performing 
interviews over an audio-based communication channel incorrectly judged interviewees as being 
deceptive more often than did individuals performing interviews via e-mail.  We found that while 
the number of lies detected was low for both types of communication, individuals communicating 
over an audio-based channel had more false alarms.  We also found that the combination of in-
advance training and a just-in-time warning did not affect receivers’ judgments about deception in 
our computer-mediated interview setting. 
KEYWORDS: deception, computer-mediated communication, interviews 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Understanding deception is important because lying is a daily activity [Vrij, 2000].  Unfortunately, 
researchers have found that individuals are generally good at lying and bad at detecting lies.  
Individuals’ average deception detection rate is only 35% [Levine et al., 1999].   These results are 
particularly important to businesses, where individuals can use deception to further personal 
goals that differ from the goals of the organization.  One business setting that is particularly 
vulnerable to deception is the job applicant interview setting.  Previous research identified a 
problem with applicant résumé faking [George et al., 2004].  Challenger [1997] reported that over 
a third of applicants lie on their résumés. 
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One of the major influences on individuals’ ability to detect résumé faking is the computer-
mediated communication (CMC) that is now part of many business processes.  Electronic mail 
and instant messaging technologies are a daily part of organizational communication.  A 
development that furthered the use of computer-mediated communication is the growth of online 
job websites where individuals post their résumés.  When employers view applicant résumés 
online, they can e-mail applicants to verify their information and filter out bad candidates.  This 
procedure can lead to a stream of questions and answers where employers and applicants 
exchange a substantial amount of information through a computer-mediated channel.  
Unfortunately, computer-mediated communication filters many cues to deception, leaving these 
individuals with limited cues to deception, and potentially making it easier for applicants to 
deceive.  Past deception research has largely ignored computer-mediated communication, and 
so there is an incomplete understanding of how individuals deceive and detection deception in 
these settings. 
Researchers have attempted to identify ways to improve individuals’ deception detection 
accuracy.  These efforts include warning individuals about deception and training individuals to 
detect deception [Biros et al., 2002; DePaulo et al., 2003; Miller and Stiff, 1993].  However, 
trained and warned individuals make more incorrect judgments about true information, which are 
known as false alarms [Biros et al., 2002].  The use of computer-mediated communication may 
also affect these tendencies because many cues to deception do not transmit in computer-
mediated communication [Daft and Lengel, 1986].  These influences are important, because if an 
individual’s number of false alarms is greater than their number of correct deception judgments, 
the individual’s reputation and task performance could be at risk.  It is therefore important for 
organizations and individuals to recognize where false alarms are more likely to occur so that 
they know where to scrutinize judgments about deception. 
In the rest of this paper, we review the literature in relation to deception, deception detection 
(including false alarms), and computer-mediated communication (Section II).  We then present 
several hypotheses about false alarms (Section III) and our research design (Section IV).  We 
conclude with a discussion of our analysis and the implications of this study. 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Deception is a message purposely transmitted to foster a false belief or conclusion in a receiver 
[Buller and Burgoon, 1996].  Deception does not happen by accident. Communicators must 
intend to foster a false belief or conclusion in receivers in order to be deceivers.  Individuals lie 
and attempt to detect lies daily, highlighting the importance of deception research [Vrij, 2000].  
Lies range from outright lies, where information is fabricated, to subtle lies, where the truth is told 
in a misleading way.  Unfortunately, people are generally good at lying and bad at detecting lies.  
Researchers found that individuals’ typical deception detection rate is only 35% [Levine et al., 
1999]. 
Interpersonal deception theory [Buller and Burgoon, 1996] is one view of how the deception and 
deception detection process works. It depicts deception as part of an ongoing process between a 
sender and receiver.  Deceptive individuals are often unable to maintain normal behavior and 
leak cues that reveal their deceptive intentions [Ekman, 1992].  This situation generally occurs 
when deceptive individuals fear deception detection or when they divert cognitive energy away 
from their effort to behave normally [Miller and Stiff, 1993].  Because deception is a cognitively 
intense process, any other activity that diverts cognitive energy away from or disrupts the 
cognitive process can cause a leakage of cues to deception.  Cues to deception include visual 
cues (pupil dilation, pressed lips, self-grooming, fidgeting, and scratching), paralanguage or vocal 
effect cues (a short response length between messages, speech errors, hesitations, and a higher 
pitch of voice), verbal cues (negative statements, irrelevant information, and generalized 
statements), and speech error cues (word/sentence repetition and slips of the tongue) [DePaulo 
et al., 2003; Zuckerman and Driver, 1985].    
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Once deceivers leak cues to deception, receivers may become suspicious.  If receivers recognize 
a deceiver’s abnormal behavior, they might listen more attentively, ask for clarification on certain 
issues, or evaluate the truthfulness of information more carefully.  If they detect suspicion, 
deceivers may also adapt their behavior in an attempt to hide more cues to their deception [Buller 
and Burgoon, 1996].   
Also important to the deception detection process is the motivation of the receiver.  The receiver 
needs some motivation to detect deceptive messages.  In some cases, the receiver may not want 
to interpret deceptive messages as being deceptive.  In situations where the receiver perceives 
that detection of deception will produce more loss than gain, the receiver may lack motivation to 
detect deceptive messages and will be persuaded by the deceiver [Miller et al., 1993].  However, 
with sufficient motivation a receiver will follow up on suspicions about leaked cues and will have 
an opportunity to detect deception. 
Most of what we know about deception involves dyads communicating in the traditional face-to-
face mode.  Investigating deception via computer-mediated modes requires an understanding of 
how different media transmit meaning during communication.  Media richness theory [Daft and 
Lengel, 1986] recognizes that differences exist in feedback, social cues, language variety, and 
personal focus in different communication channels.  These differences reflect the ability of a 
particular channel to carry equivocal information [Daft and Lengel, 1986].      
The variety of cues transmitted across different communication media varies based on the 
richness of the medium, and so different communication media can lead to varying degrees of 
cue leakage [Miller et al. 1993].  Concerning the number of communication cues transmitted, 
face-to-face communication is very rich because it can transmit a high number of cues, and text-
based media is very lean because it filters many cues.  Most electronic media are less rich than 
telephone communication, but more rich than written communication [Carlson and Zmud, 1999].  
Since many cues to deception are vision and audio based, like gestures and audio pitch [DePaulo 
et al., 2003], not all communication media allow the transmission of all the cues to deception.  For 
example, communication via telephone, a moderately rich medium, eliminates all of the visual 
communicative cues such as pupil dilation and self-grooming. Communication via e-mail, a very 
lean medium, eliminates all of the visual cues as well as the vocal cues such as pitch of voice and 
speech hesitation. 
Another factor concerning the communication medium is social presence. Social presence 
reflects the social immediacy or intimacy of a communication medium [Short et al., 1976].  The 
ability to transmit facial expression, posture, and non-verbal cues contributes to the social 
presence of the medium [Short et al., 1976].  Media that are high in media richness are also high 
in social presence.  Social presence is important because a low level of social presence can 
influence a communicators’ feelings of realness about a communication event.  Communicators’ 
feelings of realness about a communication event influence the degree of realistic dialogue in 
which they engage, and can cause them to pay less attention to a deceiver. If they are not active 
in realistic dialogue and are not paying attention to a communication partner, individuals will not 
investigate many of the limited cues that do exist in lower-richness media [Short et al., 1976]. 
One individual characteristic that is important to the success of deception is social skill. Socially 
skilled individuals may have an advantage in making more favorable impressions on others 
(Riggio 1986).  Social skill has both emotional and social dimensions (Riggio 1986).  The 
emotional dimensions include emotional expressivity, emotional sensitivity, and emotional control.  
The social dimensions include social expressivity, social sensitivity, and social control. These 
dimensions capture how adept individuals are in guiding the direction and content of 
communication, inspiring others, hiding their emotions, and in reading the emotions of others 
(Riggio 1986). These skills should lead to deception success since deception is successful when 
the individual communicating the deceptive messages is perceived as possessing no ulterior 
motives (Jones 1990). 
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Underlying most deception detection research is signal detection theory [Davies and 
Parasuraman, 1981].  Signal detection theory recognizes that several outcomes are possible 
when individuals strive to detect signals, such as deception, from background noise.  The first two 
possible outcomes are the successful detection of signals or background noise. The other 
outcomes include false alarms, which are incorrect judgments about background noise, and 
misses, which are incorrect judgments about signals.  Research based on signal detection theory 
shows that individuals with greater knowledge and experience in a task domain are better 
equipped to detect a wider set of signals from background noise.  However signal detection 
theory also explains that individuals can become overly sensitized to the possibility of deception 
and produce an excessive number of false alarms.  Since signals such as deception can be 
ambiguous, individuals must make decisions on how to judge unclear signals.  Individuals' 
expectations of the number of signals present will affect these judgments, and so the expectation 
of many signals will lead to false alarms [Klein et al., 1997]. 
Traditional deception research has primarily focused on face to face situations and found that 
individuals are typically poor at detection deception.  A review of deception literature found that 
on average individuals correctly detected 78% of truthful messages and 35% of lies in previous 
studies [Levine et al., 1999].  While researchers found low detection rates in previous research, 
false alarms were not found to be a significant problem.  Receivers had more correct 
identifications about lies than false alarms in previous studies.  Unfortunately, there is virtually no 
research on computer-mediated settings in these reviews, and so the effect of false alarms in 
settings where cues to deception are limited by the communication medium is still unknown. 
Two strategies that researchers use to increase deception detection success are training and 
warning receivers about deception [Biros et al., 2002; DePaulo et al., 2003; Miller and Stiff, 1993].  
Simply warning receivers about the potential for deception can increase receivers' suspicion of 
deception, decrease the truth bias, and improve detection deception accuracy [McCornack and 
Levine, 1990].  However, some researchers found that increased suspicion may not increase 
detection because it leads to false alarms [Burgoon et al., 1994; Miller and Stiff, 1993; 
Parasuraman, 1984].   
If people are trained to be aware of cues for deception, they should be better able to recognize 
cues and improve their chances of detecting deception. Cues such as higher voice pitch, blinking, 
and speech hesitations can be taught to receivers before they make deception judgments 
[DePaulo et al., 2003; deTurck et al., 1985; Ekman et al., 1991; Vrij,  2000; Zuckerman et al., 
1984].  If people are not aware of these cues, they may rely on incorrect information about cues 
to deception [Fiedler et al., 1993]. Training has been shown to lower the truth bias and improve 
detection rates [Stiff et al., 1992], and some researchers have suggested that giving training right 
before a task, or just-in-time training, may be more effective than traditional training that contains 
a time lapse between the training and the task [Biros et al., 2002; Globerson et al., 2001].  
However, others have suggested that training be given ahead of time so the subjects can digest 
the training over a period of time [Frank et al., 2003].  Researchers recently found that just-in-time 
training and warning increased the number of false alarms, making the benefit of JIT training and 
warnings questionable [Biros et al., 2002].  While training and warnings appear to help with 
deception detection, their relationship with false alarms, and whether they should be applied early 
or late in the process, are not completely clear. 
III. HYPOTHESES 
We developed two hypotheses based on the literature discussed in Section II to further the 
understanding of false alarms deception judgments in two largely unexplored communication 
settings.  Our first hypothesis looks at the differences between audio-based computer-mediated 
communication and text-based CMC.  Visual cues, such as those related to body movements, are 
not transmitted over either type of channel, and audio cues are not available via text-based 
computer-mediated channels.  Without these cues, receivers will be uncertain about the limited 
cues that lean communication messages do transmit, and uncertainty has been found to lead to 
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truthful judgments about deceivers [Vrij, 2000]. Therefore, individuals with extremely limited cues 
on which to base their judgments will be less likely to label deceivers as being deceptive.  Also 
important is the level of realness receivers feel while communicating. This realness is a result of 
the social presence of the communication medium.  Since e-mail is one of the leanest 
communication channels, individuals will feel a very low level of realness about the 
communication process when communicating with it.  A lack of realness will lead to receivers to 
make fewer deceptive judgments.  Audio-based CMC, while still a lean medium, allows 
individuals to transmit more communication cues that lead to a higher level of perceived realness 
about the communication process. This feeling of realness will cause receivers to be more active 
in the communication process and investigate more cues to deception.  This will lead to more 
deceptive judgments, even though detection will be difficult with the limited number of cues with 
which they are working.  We therefore hypothesize that: 
H1: Individuals communicating over an audio-based computer-mediated communication 
channel will have more false alarms than individuals communicating over a text-based 
computer-mediated communication channel. 
Recent research has found that just-in-time (JIT) training and warning leads to more false alarms 
and that in-advance training alone does not affect detection [Biros et al., 2002].  The combination 
of warning and in-advance classroom training has not yet been tested even though individuals in 
real organizations often receive this type of training.  Because it is often not possible to train an 
individual right before they perform a task, in-advance training is used. The combination of 
training and a just-in-time warning will heighten the level of suspicion of receivers.  According to 
interpersonal deception theory, suspicious receivers will attempt to identify potential cues to 
deception [Buller and Burgoon, 1996].  However, since cues to deception are so sparse in 
computer-mediated communication they will have a greater number of false alarms. We therefore 
hypothesize that: 
H2: Individuals who are trained in advance to detect deception and are warned about 
potential deception will have more false alarms than individuals who are not trained or 
warned about deception. 
IV. RESEARCH DESIGN 
We used a 2x2x2 factorial design for this study, with training (present vs. absent), warning 
(present vs. absent), and communication medium (audio CMC vs. text CMC) as our independent 
variables.  For training, we gave 50 percent of the receivers in the study classroom training on the 
reliable cues to deception.  For warning, we gave 50 percent of the receivers in the study a verbal 
warning about deception right before they performed their task.  For the text CMC treatment, 
participants used Microsoft Hotmail, and for the audio treatment, participants communicated via 
an audio relay using headphones and a microphone.  Subjects were randomly assigned to 
treatments, and there were ten groups per treatment cell, for a total of 80 groups. 
V.  EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE 
We conducted an experiment in which we tested 160 undergraduate business students at a large 
Southeastern university in a simulated interview setting similar to the one used in a previously 
conducted study [George et al., 2004].  All participants were given class extra credit and $10 as 
an incentive to participate.   
We randomly assigned participants to one of two different computer-based communication 
media, e-mail (using Hotmail) or an audio relay (a phone conversation using NetMeeting).  In 
addition, we warned half of the interviewers about deception. There were told, “Remember, 40 
percent of all applicants have been found to have lied on their applications,” right before the 
interview started.  
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One week before their scheduled experimental sessions, participants were required to attend a 
classroom training session.  We trained forty of the students (half of the students that would serve 
as interviewers during the experimental task) with a short 20-minute video about cues to 
deception.  The training was about deception in general, and did not focus on computer-mediated 
communication.  Subjects completed a pre-test on deception detection and were told that they 
would be taking another short quiz after watching the video, in order to motivate them to learn 
from the video.  The video covered audio, visual, and textual cues to deception, but it did not 
include specific information about screening résumés.  The training test scores showed that 
subjects improved their deception detection skills. Subjects had an average pre-test score of 6 
out of 15 questions correct and an average post-test score of 11 out of 15 questions correct.  We 
showed the remaining participants (the subjects that would serve as interviewees and the other 
interviewers) a dummy-video about interviewing so that they would have the same time 
commitment as the trained participants. 
The students showed up for their experimental session the week after they attended the training 
(or dummy training).  We paired each student with another student, but neither knew the other’s 
identity.  In the experimental sessions, students reported individually to a suite of interview rooms.  
We kept the students separated so that interviewers and applicants could not see each other.  
One student became the interviewer and the other became the interviewee.  One student in each 
dyad arrived at the experiment site 15 minutes before the other.  We placed the first student to 
arrive in the role of the applicant, and the student who arrived second served as the interviewer.   
We told the applicants that their department was developing a scholarship for a top student.  We 
then told the applicants that we needed them to fill out a sample application with the goal of 
making themselves look like top candidates, so that the standards for the scholarship could be 
set.  Students completed the scholarship application using items from their actual résumé that 
they brought to the session.  Although we never said it explicitly, all participants inferred that 
falsifying their personal information was acceptable to make them appear as top candidates for 
the scholarship.   
After we identified the items they changed from their actual résumé, we informed the applicants 
that an interviewer was going to question them about their applications, and that they needed to 
convince the interviewers that the applications were completely legitimate.  We told them that 
they would not see the interviewers and they would only communicate via computer.  To protect 
the applicants’ identities, we omitted their names. 
We told the later-arriving students they would be acting as interviewers.  Each interviewer was 
told he or she would be interviewing a student who was applying for a top scholarship in his or 
her department.  They knew they were part of a study, but they did not know the scholarship was 
not real, which increased their motivation to spot lies.  We informed Interviewers that the 
interviews would be occurring over computer-based media.  We then transferred the falsified 
application to the interviewer’s computer, and we instructed interviewers to ask the applicants 
about questions based on the information on the résumé. The interviewers had up to 20 minutes 
to conduct their interviews. 
Following the interview, subjects answered questionnaires to measure their motivation and social 
skills. We asked interviewers if they felt applicants had lied about their applications and to state 
what they thought was false. This style of questioning is common in deception research [George 
and Marett, 2004; George et al., 2004; Marett, 2004], although it should be recognized that it 
might serve as another warning about deception.  We also measured deceiver social skill with 
thirty items that assessed both verbal and nonverbal social communication skill [Riggio, 1986] 
and receiver motivation with nine items that assessed the receiver’s vigilance, effort, and 
suspicious beliefs [Burgoon et al., 1994]. 
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VI. RESULTS 
To test the hypotheses, we ran a MANOVA with three covariates: the number of lies, receiver 
motivation, deceiver social skills, and two dependent variables: the number of correct deception 
judgments and the correct number of false alarms.  We controlled for the number of lies because 
the frequency of lies should increase the suspicion of receivers and the number of judgments 
they make.  We measured the number of correct judgments in order to gauge the importance of 
false alarms.  We gathered data for our dependent variables from an item response on the 
receiver’s questionnaire.  We first asked the receiver, “Do you believe that person you 
interviewed was being dishonest?”  We then asked the receiver to write down the specific items 
about which they thought the applicant was lying. The number of correct judgments and false 
alarms were then calculated by comparing the statements the receiver indicated they perceived 
the sender was being dishonest about, with the actual dishonest statements on the sender’s other 
résumé.  We used established scales to measure the receiver’s motivation [Burgoon et al., 1994] 
and deceiver’s social skills [Riggio, 1986].  Both receiver motivation and deceiver social skills are 
important influences on the deception process that was previously discussed.  Since MANOVA 
analyses are sensitive to outliers, data that were outside of two standard deviations from the 
mean for our dependent variables were not included in the analysis.   We removed three outliers 
from the analysis.   
Table 1 shows the means, standard deviations, and correlations among the study variables.  We 
first looked at the F-tests for our covariates.  The overall F-tests for all of our covariates were 
significant: the number of lies (F(2,65) = 4.25, p < .019), receiver motivation (F(2,65) = 7.57, p < 
.002), and deceiver social skills (F(2,65) = 3.98, p < .025).  When looking at the individual F-tests, 
we found that all three covariates were significantly related to the number of false alarms: the 
number of lies (F(1,66) = 7.21, p < .010), receiver motivation (F(1,66) = 1.02, p < .001), and 
deceiver social skills (F(1,66) = 7.67, p < .008). 
Table 2 shows the false alarms descriptive statistics for each of our hypotheses.  The overall F-
test (Wilks' Lambda) for the communication medium was significant (F(2,65) = 4.41, p < .017).  
The overall F-test for the variables training and warning (F(2,65) = .24, p < .785) was not 
significant, so we did not find support for our second hypothesis. 
Given that the overall F-test for the communication medium was significant, we were able to look 
at the individual F-test for false alarms to test our first hypothesis.  There was a statistically 
significant effect for false alarms (F(1,66) = 5.712, p < .021).  Receivers communicating over the 
audio-based CMC channel had more false alarms (mean = .13, s.d. = .414) than did receivers 
communicating over the text-based CMC channel (mean = .03, s.d. = 0.160), supporting our first 
hypothesis. 
We also looked at the number of correct judgments between these groups in order to understand 
our findings regarding the first hypothesis.  We found no significant difference in the correct 
number of lies identified between the individuals using audio-based CMC and the groups using 
text-based CMC; there was no correlation between the number of false alarms and the number of 
correct detections.  However, the audio-based CMC groups did have more false alarms (.13 
average false alarms, s.d. = .414) than correct detections (.08 average correct detections, s.d. = 
.273), while the text-based CMC groups had fewer false alarms (.03 average false alarms, s.d. = 
.160) than correct detections (.44 average correct judgments, s.d.  1.209). The average number 
of lies in the audio sessions was 9.40 (s.d. = 3.433), and the average number of lies in the e-mail 
session was 8.38 (s.d. = 3.295).  
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Table 1. Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations 
 M SD  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
1. Trained .49 .503               
2. Warned .48 .503 - .01             
3. Medium 1.51 .503 - .01  .01           
4. Identified 
Lies .26 .894 .06  .19  .20         
5. False Alarms .08 .315 .00  .01 - .02 - .07       
6. Receiver 
Motivation 16.76 1.728 .36
**  .35** .00  .19  .34**     
7. Deceiver 
Social Skills 4.28 .944 .03  .04 - .12 - .03 - .23
* - .09   
8. Lies 8.86 3.382 - .17 - .03 - .12  .09 - .26*  .25* - .43** 
     N = 77 
   * p<.05, **p<.05 (2-tailed) 
 
Table 2: False Alarms Descriptive Statistics 
Mean SD N 
H1 (supported)    
Audio-based CMC .13 .414 38 
Text-based CMC .03 .160 39 
   
H2 (Not Supported)    
Not trained or warned .10 .447 20 
Trained and warned .11 .323 18 
 
The statistics in Table 3 about the numbers of lies, correct lie identifications, and missed lies help 
put the false alarms data in context.  Even though deceivers provided an average of eight lies or 
more in each of the experimental conditions, the number of lie identifications (hits) and false 
alarms was less than one for each condition. That is, interviewers thought that the large majority 
of the interviewees’ lies were truthful statements. 
VII. DISCUSSION 
We found support for our first hypothesis.  Interviewers who communicated over audio-based 
CMC generated more false alarms than did interviewers who communicated over e-mail.  We 
hypothesized that the small number of cues and low level of perceived realness associated with 
communication over an extremely lean medium like e-mail would result in few false alarms, 
compared to moderate number of cues and higher level of perceived realness associated with a 
moderately rich medium, like audio.  This implies that semi-rich communication media (such as 
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audio-based CMC) may actually be more detrimental to deception detection than extremely lean 
communication media (such as text-based CMC), since the number of correct detections of lies is 
low for both of types of media. Comparable studies in face to face settings have a significantly 
higher average lie-detection rate (35%) [Levine et al., 1999], which highlights the importance of 
understanding deception in computer-mediated environments. We also found that individuals 
communicating with the audio-based CMC had a greater number of false alarms than correctly 
identified lies.  Such a tendency could harm individuals’ reputations and have a detrimental 
impact on their task performance.   
Table 3: Lies, hits, and misses per treatment (standard deviations in parentheses) 
 































The differences in the number of false alarms across media were not accompanied by differences 
in the number of correct detections of lies.  Both the text-based and the audio-based 
communication channels likely hindered the detection accuracy of receivers enough that there 
was no difference in the number of hits.  As previously mentioned, the number of hits identified in 
this study was significantly lower than the average number of hits identified in traditional face-to-
face studies.  This leads us to believe that more cues to deception (than are available in audio-
based communication) are needed in order for receivers to have a significantly higher level of 
detection accuracy. 
We also found that the combination of deception detection training a week before the task was 
performed and a JIT warning about deception did not affect the number of false alarms.  The cue 
detection skills that individuals acquired from the training were likely overcome by the low 
richness and social presence of the computer mediated setting.  Receivers did not see many of 
the cues that they were taught in the training, and they did not follow up on suspicions because of 
the low social presence of the media.  These findings show that in-advance training may not 
change the behavior of receivers in computer-mediated settings, even with a warning about 
deception right before their interaction with a deceiver.  
VIII. LIMITATIONS 
Testing students in an artificial interview setting is a limitation of this study.  Students took roles 
as interviewers and interviewees in a situation in which they did not have a stake.  However, we 
did not tell them that the scholarship they were interviewing for was not real, leading them to 
believe they were trying to set the standards for a future scholarship.  Also, the average age and 
average experience of the student subjects were likely different than those of the average 
organizational employee.  These differences could affect individuals’ deception and deception 
detection tendencies.  However, previous studies have found that individuals with experience in 
deception detection may not do better than inexperienced individuals in deception detection 
[Burgoon et al., 1994; Ekman et al., 1991], meaning that student subjects might not be different 
than business employees.  Regardless, the differences between student subjects and business 
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employees are unclear, and they should be recognized when interpreting the findings from this 
study. 
Another potential limitation to this study is the style of questioning we used when measuring 
deception detection.  We asked receivers after the interview if they felt applicants had lied about 
their applications and to state what they thought was false.  Although this style of questioning is 
used in other deception studies [George and Marett, 2004; George et al., 2004; Marett, 2004], it 
could cause a receiver to make more deceptive judgments since the question highlights the 
possibility of deception.  There was likely no bias in this study since the number of deceptive 
judgments was low, and because there was a difference in the number of false alarms in the two 
communication settings. However, it should be noted that this style of questioning could 
potentially cause receivers to make more deceptive judgments in certain settings. 
The generalization of our findings to settings other than interview settings is also questionable.  
The context in which the deception takes place can affect the cognitive load and motivation of the 
participants, both of which can affect the deception process.  Individuals performing a task with 
higher or lower difficulty and different implications might deceive or detect deception in a different 
manner. 
IX. FUTURE RESEARCH 
We found that the combination of in-advance deception detection training and a JIT warning 
about deception did not have the same effect as JIT training and warning in another recent study 
[Biros et al., 2002].  These findings show that in-advance training may not change the behavior of 
receivers, even with a warning about deception right before their interaction with a deceiver.  The 
differences between in advance deception training and JIT training in computer-mediated settings 
are unclear, and a study that tests both JIT and in-advance training for deception in computer-
mediated settings would help further the understanding of training for deception detection. 
Another direction for future research would be to test individuals in an actual business setting.  
Since students do not have the experience that the average business worker does, they might 
formulate lies and detect lies less efficiently than a more experienced worker.  A future study in 
an actually business setting with actual workers as subjects would help reveal what differences 
might be present in such a setting. 
A final direction for future research concerns the behavior of deceivers lying over different 
communication media. Deceivers may have different tendencies when communicating over lean 
and rich media and it may be more difficult to lie over certain media. Future studies should 
explore this half of the deception process to better understand deceivers’ tendencies in different 
settings. 
X. CONCLUSIONS 
A limited number of communication cues are available in computer-mediated communication 
[Daft and Lengel, 1986].  Limited cues to deception lead to confusion and inactivity in receivers 
due to the unavailability of secondary cues such as body movements.  Our results indicate that 
individuals communicating over a moderately rich audio-based channel have more false alarms 
than individuals communicating over an extremely lean text-based communication channel.  
However, we found that there was no difference in the number of lies detected between the two 
groups.  In addition, individuals communicating with audio had more false alarms than correct 
identifications. 
There are several implications from these findings that are relevant to organizations. 
1. Computer-mediated communication is now a key part of many organizational processes, such 
as the interview process. Organizations must realize individuals’ weaknesses in these settings.  
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2.  Initial job interviews conducted over audio channels are commonplace.  However, they may 
now be initially conducted via e-mail.  The findings of this study show that individuals conducting 
interviews over the phone may be at more risk of incorrectly judging interviewees as deceptive 
more frequently than individuals conducting interview via e-mail.   
3. While the deception detection rate can be low for both types of communication, individuals 
communicating over an audio-based channel are subject to more false alarms.  Individuals 
conducting interviews need to be aware of these tendencies so that they can be careful when 
making judgments about deception.  
4.  Organizations may want to communicate with interviewees over several communication 
channels to minimize the weaknesses of communicators using a single channel.   
5. We found that the combination of in-advance training and a just-in-time warning does not offer 
any benefits to receivers in computer-mediated interview settings.  If organizations want to take 
proactive measures against deception, they might use JIT training and warning, which has been 
found to have some impact on deception detection and task performance [Biros et al., 2002].   
Once individuals and organizations recognize these tendencies, they should be better able to 
minimize the negative effects of false alarms. 
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